Abstract-The secrecy of a communication system in which both the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper are allowed some distortion is investigated. The secrecy metric considered is the exponent of the probability that the eavesdropper estimates the source sequence successfully within an acceptable distortion level. The problem is first studied when the transmitter and the legitimate receiver do not share any key and the transmitter is not subject to a rate constraint, which corresponds to a stylized model of a side channel and reveals connections to source coding with side information. The setting is then generalized to include a shared secret key between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver and a rate constraint on the transmitter, which corresponds to the Shannon cipher system. A single-letter characterization of the highest achievable exponent is provided, and asymptotically-optimal strategies for both the primary user and the eavesdropper are demonstrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
To compromise the security of a communication network, an eavesdropper need not have direct access to the decrypted content of the transmitted packets. In fact, simply monitoring and analyzing the network flow may help an eavesdropper deduce sensitive information. For example, Song et al. [1] show that the Secure Shell (SSH) is vulnerable to what is called timing attacks. In SSH, each keystroke is immediately sent to the remote machine, and an eavesdropper can thus observe the timing of the keystrokes. It is shown that this information can be used to significantly speed up the search for passwords, and it is estimated that each consecutive pair of keystrokes leaks around 1 bit of information. Zhang and Wang [2] enhance the attack proposed in [1] , and apply it in the setting of multi-user operating systems, in which a malicious user eavesdrops on other users' keystrokes. Timingbased attacks appear also in various other settings, including: compromising the anonymity of users in networks [3, 4] , information leakage in the context of shared schedulers [5] and in the context of on-chip networks [6] .
In this paper, we consider a stylized model of such information leakage problems, and call it the information blurring system. The setup, shown in Figure 1 , consists of the following. A transmitter observes a sequence X n , which corresponds roughly to the original timing vector, and maps it to a sequence Y n that is observed by both the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper. The mapping must almost surely satisfy a distortion constraint, which corresponds to some quality constraints imposed by the network (e.g., delay constraints). We do not require the mapping to be causal as the intent of this work is to provide fundamental limits for a simplified version of the information leakage problem. In broad terms, the transmitter wants to blur the information in X n (hence the name), so that it is no longer useful for the eavesdropper. For example, one approach is to artificially add noise to the input sequence. In that sense, the problem is related to methods for ensuring differential privacy, in which a curator wants to publicly release statistical information about a given population without compromising the privacy of its individuals [7, 8] .
Upon observing the output Y n , the eavesdropper, who knows the source statistics and the transmitter's encoding function, tries to estimate X n . We introduce a distortion function and consider the eavesdropper's estimate to be successful if the distortion it incurs is below a given level. Hence, we measure the secrecy guaranteed by a given scheme via the probability that the eavesdropper makes a successful guess. The primary user (i.e., the transmitter legitimate-receiver pair) aims then to minimize that probability. Since computing the exact probability is quite difficult, this paper will be mainly concerned with asymptotic analysis: we will derive the rate of decay (i.e., the exponent) of the probability of a successful guess. Other metrics for quantifying secrecy exist in the literature; we discuss the motivations and the shortcomings of the commonly used ones in Section II.
For a discrete memoryless source (DMS), we provide a single-letter characterization of the optimal exponent (cf. Theorem 1). We show that the problem is related to source coding with side information. Essentially, the eavesdropper first attempts to guess the joint type of X n and Y n . S/he, then, "pretends" that Y n is received through a memoryless channel the probability law of which is the conditional probability P (Y |X) induced by the joint type. The problem can be viewed at this point as compression with side information, so the eavesdropper picks a codeword from an optimal rate-distortion code. The primary user's objective, therefore, is to supply the "worst" side information. Moreover, we demonstrate asymptotically-optimal universal schemes for both the primary user and the eavesdropper. The schemes are universal in the sense that they do not depend on the source statistics. In particular, the transmitter operates on a type-by-type basis, and associates with each type a rate-distortion code, the construction of which is based on the conditional probability law that provides the "worst" side information given that type.
Next, we extend the study to the setup in which the transmitter is subject to a rate constraint, and the transmitter and the legitimate receiver have access to a common source of randomness, called the key. The eavesdropper has full knowledge of the encryption system, except for the realization of the key and the realization of X n . The setup is shown in Figure 2 , and the special case in which the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper must reconstruct the source exactly is known as the Shannon cipher system [9] . Since the transmitter is subject Fig. 2 . The Shannon cipher system with lossy communication: the transmitter and the legitimate receiver have access to a common key K, which consists of nr purely random bits, where r is called the key rate. The transmitter encodes X n using K, and sends a message M through a noiseless public channel of rate R. Both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are allowed a certain level of distortion. The legitimate receiver generates the reconstruction Y n based on M and K, whereas the eavesdropper has access to M only to produce an estimate V n .
to a rate constraint, we allow the primary user to violate the distortion constraint, but restrict the probability of such event to be exponentially decaying. We again derive a singleletter characterization of the optimal exponent (cf. Theorem 2), and demonstrate asymptotically-optimal strategies for both the primary user and the eavesdropper. In particular, similarly to the previous setting, the transmitter operates on a type-by-type basis and associates with each type a rate-distortion code, the construction of which is based on the conditional probability law that provides the worst side information and satisfies the rate constraint (however, types with low enough probability are discarded, by associating a dummy messsage to all the source sequences belonging to such types). To make use of the shared key, we (randomly) generate many instances of such codes, and use the secret key to randomize the choice of the code selected for encoding X n . We also investigate conditions under which the resulting codes are optimal ratedistortion codes. As for the eavesdropper, we show that one of the following two schemes is optimal. The first consists of generating a blind guess, i.e., completely ignoring the public message. The second consists of guessing the value of the key to reproduce the reconstruction at the legitimate receiver, and then applying the strategy developed in the first part of the paper.
We note that Theorem 2 subsumes Theorem 1 by setting the key rate to be zero, and the channel rate to be high enough. We nevertheless present them separately for two reasons. We believe the information blurring system to be of independent interest, as it corresponds to problems different from the Shannon cipher system (e.g., the SSH timing attack). As such, Theorem 1 can serve as a baseline for future refinements of this model (say, by requiring the encoding to be causal). Moreover, it significantly simplifies the exposition of the results, by first revealing the connection to source coding with side information and then introducing the key and the rate constraint.
Finally, it should be noted that Weinberger and Merhav studied the Shannon cipher system with lossy communication [10, 11] (i.e, the setup of the second part of this paper), and independently suggested the same secrecy metric we proposed. Furthermore, they allowed a variable key rate. In their initial work [10] , they derived the optimal exponent under the assumption that the distortion constraint of the eavesdropper is more lenient than that of the legitimate receiver (which makes the no-key problem degenerate). Our initial work (an earlier submission of the current paper) characterized the optimal exponent only under certain conditions (including the no-key case), which are not satisfied in the setting of [10] , and provided general upper and lower bounds. As such, those results were not comparable with that of [10] . Weinberger and Merhav later [11] generalized their result to characterize the exponent in general, as is done here. However, the suggested scheme herein and its subsequent analysis are significantly simpler. In particular, our scheme uses a traditional random coding construction followed by a separate key-based randomization.
II. SECRECY METRIC
The information-theoretic study of secrecy systems was initiated by Shannon in [9] . Shannon derived the following negative result: ensuring perfect secrecy, i.e., making the source sequence X n and the public message M (cf. Figure 2 ) statistically independent, requires that the key rate be at least as large as the message rate.
As opposed to perfect secrecy, the notion of "partial" secrecy is more difficult to quantify. However, the impracticality of ensuring perfect secrecy, as implied by Shannon's result, means that developing such a notion is important from a practical point of view as well as a theoretical one. Shannon used equivocation -the conditional entropy of the source sequence given the public message H(X n |M ) -as a "theoretical secrecy index". A main motivation for equivocation was the similarity between the deciphering problem for the eavesdropper in the secrecy setting and the decoding problem for the receiver in the standard noisy communication setting [9] . Equivocation has subsequently been used as a secrecy metric in several works [12] - [18] . However, its use is not well motivated operationally. It only provides a lower bound on the exponent of the list size that the eavesdropper must generate to reliably include the source sequence. Moreover, Massey showed in [19] that the expected number of guesses that need to be made to correctly guess a discrete random variable X may be arbitrarily large for arbitrarily small H(X).
Merhav and Arikan [20] proposed a more direct approach: they consider an i.i.d. source and they measure secrecy by the expected number of guesses that the eavesdropper needs to make before finding the correct source sequence, which they denote by E[G(X n |M )], where G(.|m) is a "guessing" function defined for each possible public message m. This is intended to capture the scenario in which the eavesdropper has a testing mechanism to check whether or not his/her guess is correct. Such mechanism exists, for example, if the source message is a password to a computer account. When the source is discrete and memoryless, and the transmitter and the legitimate receiver have access to nr purely random common bits (where r is called the key rate), the optimal exponent of E[G(X n |M )] is found to be [20, Theorem 1]:
where P is the source distribution and D(·||·) is the KullbackLeibler (KL) divergence. Two issues arise with this metric. First, even if a testing mechanism exists, any practical system would only allow a small number of incorrect inputs. Thus, it is not clear how to interpret an exponentially large number of guesses. Second, and more importantly, it turns out that even highly-insecure systems can appear to be secure under this metric. Indeed, by modifying the asymptotically-optimal scheme proposed in [20] , we can construct a scheme for the primary user that allows the eavesdropper to find the source sequence correctly with high probability by the first guess, and yet achieves the optimal exponent in (1). The scheme proposed in [20] operates on the source sequences on a type-by-type basis, and it yields:
where o(n)/n → 0 as n → ∞, and T Q is the type class of a given type Q, i.e., the set of sequences with empirical distribution Q. Averaging over the probabilities of {T Q } yields the exponent in (1) (as a lower bound). However, this means that it is enough to apply the proposed scheme to the type class T Q that achieves the maximum of [min{H(Q), r} − D(Q||P )], whereas sequences belonging to other type classes can be sent with no encoding whatsoever with no effect on the exponent. Therefore, only a set with vanishing probability is encoded, whereas sequences outside that set are immediately known by the eavesdropper 1 . A different approach, based on rate-distortion theory, was adopted by Yamamoto in [21] . A distortion function is introduced and the secrecy of a given scheme is measured by the minimum attainable expected distortion at the eavesdropper. Also, a certain level of distortion, possibly corresponding to a different distortion function, is allowed at the legitimate 1 Merhav and Arikan actually characterize, for any ρ > 0, the exponent of E[G ρ (X n |M )]. This more general result can still yield large exponents for systems that are highly insecure, although one could potentially address this issue by requiring schemes that yield large exponents simultaneously over a range of ρ values.
receiver. An earlier work by Yamamoto [22] considered the special case where no key is available, under the same secrecy metric. A standard example, discussed and generalized in [23] , shows why expected distortion is inadequate: Suppose X n is a sequence of independent and identically distributed bits with X i ∼ Ber(1/2), the transmitter and the legitimate receiver have access to one common bit K ∼ Ber(1/2), and the distortion function is the Hamming distance. The transmitter then sends the sequence X n as is if K = 0, and flips all its bits if K = 1. The induced expected distortion at the eavesdropper is then equal to 1/2, which is also the maximum expected distortion that the eavesdropper can possibly incur, since it is achievable even if the public message is not observed. However, this "optimal" scheme in fact reveals a lot about the true source sequence; namely, it is one of only two possible candidates.
To overcome this limitation of expected distortion, Schieler and Cuff [24, 25] allow the eavesdropper to generate an exponentially-sized list of estimates and propose the expected minimum distortion over the list as a secrecy metric. It is not clear, however, how to operationally interpret a list of exponential size. It is shown that this setting is equivalent to the following: there exists a "henchman" that has access to the source sequence X n and public message M , and can transmit nR L bits to the eavesdropper who measures secrecy by the minimum expected distortion. However, this metric leads to a degenerate trade-off between the key rate r, the allowed list exponent (henchman rate) R L , and the expected minimum distortion in the list D e . For example, if the legitimate receiver must reconstruct X n losslessly, one of two cases occurs (see [25, Theorem 1] ): If r > R L , D e is given by the rate-distortion function at R L . If r ≤ R L , D e = 0 since the eavesdropper can trivially find the exact sequence by listing all the possible keys. This fails to capture that, even when R L < r, the eavesdropper can still list 2 nR L possible keys and thus recover exactly the correct sequence with probability at least 2 n(R L −r) . As R L approaches r, this probability can be made to decay arbitrarily slowly. It is worth noting that Schieler and Cuff also consider a causal disclosure setting [23] , in which the eavesdropper observes, at time i, the public message M and X i−1 . Although this is more robust than expected distortion, it captures only a limited range of practical scenarios.
In this paper, we take a different approach. In many applications, the eavesdropper has no way to verify if his/her estimate is correct. This is particularly true in our main case of interest, i.e., timing of events. Moreover, as mentioned before, most practical systems allow a small number of incorrect guesses even if a testing mechanism exists. Therefore, we allow the eavesdropper to make one guess only. Secrecy is measured then by the probability that the guess is successful, i.e., the distortion incurred is below a given level. For the purposes of the asymptotic analysis in this paper, we will study only the exponent of the probability of a successful guess. A special case of such analysis was considered by Merhav in [26] . In particular, [26] is concerned with necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving the perfect secrecy exponent, which is the exponent attained by the eavesdropper in the absence of any observation. It is also restricted to the case in which both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper must reconstruct the source sequence exactly. Finally, a relevant earlier work by Arikan and Merhav [27] considers the problem of blindly guessing a random variable up to a distortion level and characterizes the least achievable exponential growth of the expected number of guesses.
III. INFORMATION BLURRING SYSTEM
We consider the following secrecy system. Let X , Y, and V be the alphabets associated with the transmitter, the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper, respectively. The transmitter wants to provide the legitimate receiver with a quantized version of an n-length message
The restriction is imposed on each realization of (X n , Y n ). An eavesdropper, with an associated distortion function d e : X ×V → R + , also observes Y n and generates a guess
It is assumed that the eavesdropper knows the source statistics and the primary user's encoding function f . The secrecy metric we adopt is the probability that the eavesdropper makes a successful guess, i.e.,
The primary user's objective is to minimize this probability. So, the problem can be written as:
We characterize the highest achievable exponent of the probability of a successful guess under the following assumptions: We denote the optimal exponent by E(P, D, D e ), where P is the source distribution, i.e.,
where {f n } is restricted to the class of functions ensuring the feasibility of the primary user's problem. The existence of the limit will be seen later. We will show that the problem is related to source coding with side information, where Y n acts as side information for the eavesdropper. Therefore, the primary user's job is to provide the "worst" side information subject to a distortion constraint of his/her own. To this end, we denote the conditional rate-distortion function as:
and define the quantity R(P X , D, D e ) as:
Roughly speaking, when the joint type of X n and Y n is P XY , the eavesdropper can restrict the guessing space to 2 nR(P XY ,De) reconstruction sequences, knowing that at least one of them must satisfy the distortion constraint. The maximization in (5) corresponds to the primary user's goal of maximizing that quantity.
We prove the following properties of R(P XY , D e ) and R(P X , D, D e ) in Appendix A. 
, where R(P X , D) and R e (P X , D e ) are the rate-distortion functions corresponding to the distortion constraints d and d e , respectively.
Our main result is the characterization of the optimal exponent as follows: Theorem 1: Under assumptions (A1)-(A3), for any DMS P , and distortion functions d and d e with associated distortion levels D ≥ D min and D e ≥ D e,min , corresponding respectively to the primary user and the eavesdropper:
where Q ranges over all probability distributions on the source alphabet, and R(Q, D, D e ) is as defined in (5). Remark 1: We do not require any -backoff for D or D e to characterize the associated exponent.
An interesting feature of Theorem 1 is the emergence of mutual information as part of the solution in (6), even though the setup does not include any rate constraints. Moreover, an interesting contrast can be seen between the expression in (1) for the expected number of guesses metric and the expression in (6) for our metric. Indeed, the former evaluates the performance of a given scheme asymptotically by a weighted bestcase scenario, whereas the latter evaluates it by a weighted worst-case scenario.
As an application of the theorem, we compute the perfect secrecy exponent, which we define as the best achievable exponent when the primary user is not subject to any constraint and denote it by E 0 (P, D e ). To this end, we introduce a trivial distortion function: d(x, y) = 0, for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. Then, R(Q, D) = 0, for all Q and all D ≥ 0. It then follows from (P3) of Proposition 1 that R(Q, D, D e ) = R e (Q, D e ) for all Q. Therefore,
The next two subsections are devoted to proving Theorem 1. We first propose a scheme for the primary user and show that the induced exponent is lower-bounded by the right-hand side of (6) . From the eavesdropper's point of view, this is a converse result. Similarly, we propose a scheme for the eavesdropper and show that the induced exponent is upper-bounded by the right-hand side of (6), which establishes the desired result.
We set some notation for the remainder of the paper. In the following, Z is an arbitrary discrete set, and Z is a random variable over Z.
-The set of probability distributions over Z is denoted by P Z . -For a sequence z n ∈ Z n , Q z n is the empirical PMF of z n , also referred to as its type. -Q n Z is the set of types in Z n , i.e., the set of rational PMF's with denominator n.
, and I Q (·; ·) denote respectively expectation, entropy, and mutual information taken with respect to distribution Q. -All logarithms and exponentials are taken to the base 2.
A. Achievability for the Primary User (Eavesdropper's Converse Result)
We will show that
The primary user will operate on the source sequences on a type-by-type basis. For each type Q X ∈ Q n X , we create a rate distortion code C Q X to cover each sequence in T Q X as follows. We associate with Q X a joint type
The code is then constructed from T Q Y as given by the following lemma, which bounds the size of the code.
Lemma 2: Given > 0, there exists n 0 ( , |X |, |Y|) such that for any n ≥ n 0 , for each joint type Q XY ∈ Q n X Y , there exists a code (y
, and for all x n ∈ T Q X , there exists i satisfying (x n , y n i ) ∈ T Q XY . The proof is a refinement of the covering lemma [28, Lemma 2.4.1]. We later prove a stronger result, Lemma 9, in Appendix E.
Remark 2:
One might be tempted to use an optimal ratedistortion code for each type Q X , presuming that this choice is best at preserving secrecy since it achieves optimal compression, i.e., it only sends the necessary information. However, the problem is more subtle since the "redundancy of information" depends on the eavesdropper's distortion constraint d e . The optimal choice of Q XY will be revealed when analyzing the eavesdropper's optimal strategy. Now, fix > 0 and let n be at least as large as n 0 in Lemma 2. We will denote by C n Q X the rate distortion code associated with type Q X . Thus, the function f of the primary user is as follows: each sequence x n is mapped to a sequence y n ∈ C n Q x n satisfying Q x n y n = Q XY (where Q XY is associated with Q x n ) and subsequently
To determine the eavesdropper's optimal guess, we define
Then, for each observed y n , the optimal rule is given by
This can be understood as the MAP rule, and we denote in the remainder by 3 g o (where "o" stands for optimal). To upperbound the probability of a correct guess, we consider a genieaided rule that is aware of the type of the transmitted source sequence. That is, the genie-aided MAP rule yields
Remark 3: One should not expect the upper bound to be loose since there are only polynomially many types in n, so that the exponent is not affected. For a given y n , let f
f (x n ) = y n } be the set of sequences in T Q X that are mapped to it. Then, the observation of y n implies that
, and the genie-aided MAP rules makes a successful guess if X n ∈ B De (g o (y n , Q X )). Therefore, we will derive an upper bound on the maximum possible size of the intersection of these two sets. First, note that, x n ∈ T Q X and f (x n ) = y n implies that Q x n y n = Q XY , where Q XY is the joint type associated with
where (a) follows from the fact that (
(b) follows from Lemma 1.2.5 in [28] . Therefore, for large enough n, we get
Let P n (Q XY ) be the joint type achieving the max in (12), where the dependence on D e is suppressed since it is fixed throughout the analysis. We can now upper-bound the probability that the eavesdropper makes a successful guess as follows:
where (a) follows from (12).
(b) follows from Lemma 2.
To interpret the exponent in (13), note that P n (Q XY ) minimizes I(X; V |Y ) over Q n (Q XY , D e ) (follows readily from (12)). Therefore, I P n (Q XY ) (X; V |Y ) is roughly R(Q XY , D e ). The eavesdropper's scheme can then be seen as picking a codeword from an optimal rate-distortion code that uses side information generated according to Q Y |X .
Since Q XY is the choice of the primary user, who is interested in maximizing the exponents in (13), we define for each
where we have again suppressed the dependence on D and D e in the notation.
Remark 4:
The maximization does not depend on the source statistics, and consequently neither does the proposed encoding function f . With a slight abuse of notation, we rewrite P n (Q (Q X )) as P n (Q X ) to get
We can now rewrite (13) as
Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and noting that is arbitrary, we get
where the last inequality follows from the following proposition, the proof of which is given in Appendix B. Proposition 3:
B. Converse for the Primary User (Eavesdropper's Achievability Result) 
We will now show that
. This means that the eavesdropper can achieve the exponent in (6) for any function f the primary user implements.
We propose a two-stage scheme for the eavesdropper. In the first stage, observing y n , s/he tries to guess the joint type of x n and y n by choosing an element uniformly at random from
The correct joint type must fall in this set since the restriction
We denote the function corresponding to this stage by g 1 :
by their first argument. A summary of different notations is given in Table I .
The eavesdropper then proceeds assuming g 1 (y n ) is the correct joint type. S/he randomly chooses a sequence from a set that covers T Q X|Y (y n ). To this end, we associate with each joint type Q XY a joint type Q XY V from Q n (Q XY , D e ) (cf. Table I) , and generate a sequence uniformly at random from T Q V |Y (y n ), where Q V |Y is the conditional probability induced by Q XY V . We denote the function corresponding to this stage by g 2 :
Remark 6: The above strategy does not depend on the specifics of the function f implemented by the primary user, i.e., it only uses the fact that d(
It is also independent of the source statistics.
The following lemma lower-bounds the probability that g 2 (y n , Q XY ) generates a sequence V n satisfying d e (x n , V n ) ≤ D e , for a given pair (x n , y n ) ∈ T Q XY , i.e., assuming the eavesdropper guesses the joint type correctly.
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 1.2.5 in [28] .
Since the eavesdropper is interested in maximizing this probability, s/he will associate, with each Q XY , a joint type achieving the maximum:
Note that this is the same joint type achieving the maximum in (12) .
We can now lower-bound the probability that
, where c n = (n + 1) −|X ||Y|(|V|+1) , Q XY = Q x n y n , and g is as described above.
Proof:
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4. We now show that the above described scheme indeed achieves the exponent in (6) . Consider any possibly random function f implemented by the primary user (and satisfying the distortion constraint), and denote by P f the induced joint probability on (X n , Y n ). Now, consider the following chain of inequalities.
where (a) follows from Lemma 5.
(b) follows from (20) and (15).
Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, we get
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 3.
Combining (22) and (17) yields that the limit in (3) exists and is equal to the expression given in (6), thus establishing Theorem 1.
IV. LOSSY COMMUNICATION FOR THE SHANNON CIPHER SYSTEM
We now consider the setup of the Shannon cipher system with lossy communication. More precisely, the transmitter is subject to a rate constraint, and the transmitter and legitimate receiver share common randomness K ∈ K = {0, 1} nr , where r > 0 denotes the rate of the key. K is uniformly distributed over K and is independent of X n . The transmitter sends a message M = f (X n , K) to the receiver over a noiseless channel at rate R, i.e., M ∈ M = {0, 1} nR . The receiver, then, generates Y n = h(M, K). Both functions f and h are allowed to be stochastic, but must satisfy
The message M is overheard by the eavesdropper who knows the statistics of the source and the encoding and decoding functions f and h. However, s/he does not have access to the common randomness K.
As before, the relevant secrecy metric is the probability of a successful guess, i.e., a guess
The optimal guess is determined, again, by the MAP rule g o .
We assume (A1)-(A3) (given in Section III) hold throughout this section. We further assume 4 (A4) R > R α := max Q:D(Q||P )≤α R(Q, D). 4 For the primary user's problem to be feasible, it is necessary to have
where {f n } is restricted to the class of functions ensuring the feasibility of the primary user's problem. Similarly to (23),
We extend the definition of R(P X , D, D e ) to account for the rate constraint as follows. For a given distribution P X satisfying R(P X , D) ≤ R, R(P X , R, D, D e ) = max
Extending the properties of R(P X , D, D e ), we prove the following properties of R(P X , R, D, D e ) in Appendix C. Proposition 6: In the following statements, D ≥ D min , D e ≥ D e,min , and a given pair (P X , R) satisfy R ≥ R(P X , D).
The main result is given by the following theorem. Theorem 2: Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), for any DMS P , distortion functions d and d e with associated distortion levels D ≥ D min and D e ≥ D e,min , corresponding respectively to the primary user and the eavesdropper, and reliability exponent α:
Remark 7: The minimization over Q is due to the imposition of an exponentially decaying probability of violating the distortion constraint. If we replace it instead by Pr (d(X n , Y n ) > D) ≤ δ, for some small δ, then the second term of (25) would collapse to r + R(P, R, D, D e ).
Remark 8: We can recover Theorem 1 by setting α = +∞, r = 0, and R = log |Y|. Weinberger and Merhav's result [10, Theorem 1] can also be recovered by noting that the leniency assumption implies R(Q, R, D, D e ) = 0 for all Q. Moreover, for any
Indeed, the first condition implies R e (P, D e ) > 0, hence E 0 (P, D e ) > 0. This refines Schieler and Cuff's observation [23] that any positive key rate drives the distortion at the eavesdropper to its maximal expected value with high probability.
A straightforward but useful corollary of Theorem 2 is a necessary and sufficient condition on the key rate for the achievability of the perfect secrecy exponent. In particular,
Let r 0 be the minimum rate needed to achieve E 0 (P, D e ).
The condition in (26) is interesting in that it allows r 0 to be strictly less than E 0 (P, D e ), which itself satisfies E 0 (P, D e ) ≤ R e (P, D e ). Remark 9: One might suspect that r ≥ max Q:D(Q||P )≤α R(Q, D) is sufficient to achieve E 0 (P, D e ), since we can use good rate-distortion codes for each type and the number of available keys is large enough to completely "hide" the source sequence within a type class. This is, indeed, true as it implies the condition in (26):
The converse of Theorem 2 is based on the following analysis. To achieve the second exponent in (25) , the eavesdropper tries to guess the value of the key and then applies the scheme suggested in the previous section. Taking into consideration the rate constraint, the term R(Q, D, D e ) which appears in (6) is replaced by R(Q, R, D, D e ). Also, taking into account the modified distortion constraint, the minimization over all Q's which appears in (6) is replaced by a minimization over Q's satisfying D(Q||P ) ≤ α. The first exponent is the perfect secrecy exponent (given in (7)), which the eavesdropper can achieve even in the absence of any observation. The fact that one of these two schemes achieves the optimal exponent implies that the eavesdropper does not benefit from guessing only part of the key. Either s/he guesses the entire key correctly and proceeds, or s/he makes a completely blind guess. Interestingly, a similar observation has been made by Schieler and Cuff [25] in the context of minimum expected distortion over a list.
To describe the achievability result, it is helpful to rewrite (25) as:
The primary user will operate as follows. For low-probability types Q, particularly Q's with D(Q||P ) > α, the transmitter will send a dummy message. This is feasible because we allowed some probability of violating the distortion constraint. For such Q's, the eavesdropper receives no information. Therefore, the guessing exponent conditioned on T Q is given by R e (Q, D e ), yielding the second term of (27) .
, R e (Q, D)}. This can be understood as the exponent conditioned on X n ∈ T Q . For each such Q, we associate a joint type induced by a P Y |X that achieves the maximum in (24) . Similarly to Section III-A, we use this joint type to generate a rate-distortion code. This roughly corresponds to the term R(Q, R, D, D e ). To take advantage of the secret key, we in fact produce 2 nr such codes, and use the key to randomize the choice of the code, yielding the additional r term. Since the eavesdropper can always guess blindly and achieve the exponent R e (Q, D), we get min{r + R(Q, R, D, D e ), R e (Q, D)}. We will show in Lemma 9 that such random construction fails to achieve the desired exponent with only doubly exponentially small probability.
As mentioned, the code construction for each type depends on the conditional P Y |X achieving the maximum in (24) . A natural question arises: under what conditions does the optimal test channel (which we will denote by P Y |X ) achieve that max? One can readily verify that this holds when R(Q, R, D, D e ) = 0 (e.g., the eavesdropper's constraint is more lenient than that of the legitimate receiver). We further investigate this question by considering special cases of Theorem 2.
A. Applications of Theorem 2
In the following, assume α = +∞. Hence, R > max Q R(Q, D).
1) Perfect Reconstruction at the Eavesdropper: Suppose V = X , and the eavesdropper is required to reconstruct the source sequence perfectly, i.e., the secrecy metric is Pr(V n = X n ). In our formulation, this is equivalent to setting d e to be the Hamming distance and D e to 0. Then, for each Q, we get R(Q, R, D, 0) = max
Note that the maximum is achieved by the optimal test channel, and the exponent is given by
where we have used the equivalent form (27) . Note that, in contrast to R(Q, R, D, D e ) = 0, this case corresponds to a more lenient constraint at the legitimate receiver, which leads us to our next example.
2) Binary Source with Hamming Distortion and D e ≤ D:
and d e are both the Hamming distance, and D e ≤ D < 1/2. We prove the following lemma in Appendix D.
It follows from property (P5) of Proposition 6 that
Therefore, the exponent is given by:
where
H(D e ) ≤ H(Q) ≤ H(D) ,
and
H(Q) ≥ H(D) .
If X ∼ Ber(1/2), then D(Q||P ) = 1−H(Q), and the minima corresponding to the first two cases reduce to 1 − H(D e ). The third minimum can be computed as follows:
Therefore,
The resulting expression when r < 1 − H(D) admits a simple geometric explanation, shown in Figure 3 below. Upon observing the public message, the candidate source sequences are clustered into 2 nr balls. Each ball corresponds to a possible value of the key K, and has volume 2 nH(D) since it is the pre-image of a possible reconstruction at the legitimate receiver. For the eavesdropper, the maximum volume of the ball that s/he can generate to "engulf" candidate sequences The dots represent sequences in a type class T Q . Each of the 2 nr non-dashed circles represents a Hamming-distortion ball of radius D, corresponding to a possible reconstruction at the legitimate receiver. Thus, dots within the circle (in blue) represent candidate source sequences. The dashed circle represents the distortion ball of radius De around the eavesdropper's reconstruction, and it fits entirely in a non-dashed circle.
is 2 nH(De) . Due to the structure of Hamming distortion, this maximally-sized ball can fit entirely into any one of the clusters, so that the probability of a successful guess is 2 nH(De) 2 −n(r+H(D)) . Note that the geometric interpretation assumed that we are using good rate-distortion codes (to get pre-images of volume 2 nH(D) ). The described structure is also reminiscent of successive refinement [29] . These can be explained by the following lemma. V |XY be the minimizer in (55), and P (2) V |XY the minimizer in (56). Then, 
B. Achievability Proof
We show that
} by demonstrating an encoding-decoding strategy for the primary user that achieves the given exponent.
As before, the primary user will operate on the source sequences on a type-by-type basis. The result is driven by the following lemma, which is based on the analysis of Schieler and Cuff [25] and the proof of which is given in Appendix E.
n N ) by choosing N elements independently and uniformly at random from T Q Y . 1) Covering: For x n ∈ T Q X , define
and the event
Then, there exists n 1 ( , |X |, |Y|) (independent of Q XY ) such that, for all n ≥ n 1 ,
2) Guessing-single code: Suppose X n ∼ Unif(T Q X ) and C n / ∈ E. Let P C M |X n be as follows. Given x n , M is chosen uniformly at random from C(x n ). Then, for all n ≥ n 1 , for all v n ∈ V n and all m ∈ [N ],
where the probabilities are computed with respected to the randomness in P C M |X n , and the expectation with respect to the distribution of the code C n . 3) Guessing-multiple codes: Let K be uniform over K = [2 nr ], r > 0, and independent of X n (which is uniform over
where the probability is computed with respect to P
where the probability is computed with respected to the distributions of the codes {C n k } k .
The first part of the Lemma asserts that if we generate the codebook randomly, then each x n ∈ T Q X will be covered by a small number of codewords (the probability that this event does not occur is doubly exponentially small). Therefore, if we encode x n by choosing a codeword uniformly at random from its cover, the induced P X n |Y n (.|y n ) will be roughly uniform over the set T Q X|Y (y n ) = {x n : (x n , y n ) ∈ T Q XY }. Consequently, given a codeword index m and v n ∈ V n , the second part bounds the probability that v n covers X n , and also bounds the expectation (over the choice of the codebook) of that probability.
Finally, the third part considers generating 2 nr codebooks and the induced distribution P X n |M , where M is the index of a chosen codeword. This distribution roughly corresponds to generating 2 nr elements uniformly at random from T Q Y , revealing the chosen elements to the adversary, then choosing one of them uniformly at random and generating X n uniformly at random from T Q X|Y (Y n ). This setup is similar to the one studied by Schieler and Cuff [25, Theorem 4] . Equation (35) states that, for most realizations of the codebooks, the probability that the adversary generates a successful guess, given a codeword index, is upper-bounded by 2 −n(min{Re(Q X ,De),r+R(Q XY ,De)} . The implication is that the best the adversary could do is 1) either ignore the index and guess X n blindly, 2) or guess which codebook is being used (i.e., guess the value of the key K) and use the scheme suggested in the previous section.
Note that such δ exists since lim δ→0 R α+δ = R α (which follows from Proposition 13 in Appendix A and the fact that D(Q||P ) is convex). Fix R such that R α+δ < R < R, and > 0 such that < R − R . Let
Let n be large as given by Lemma 9. For each type Q X ∈ Q n X (α, δ), we associate a joint type Q XY and generate
k=1 ∈Ẽ c where the size of each codebook is upper-bounded by 2 n(I Q XY (X;Y )+ ) (the existence of such codes follows from (35)). Since the primary user wants to minimize the probability of a successful guess by the eavesdropper, but must also satisfy a rate constraint, the associated type is chosen as follows:
The encoding function f is as follows. Given a source sequence x n satisfying Q x n ∈ Q n X (α, δ), and a realization of the key k, a reconstruction sequence is chosen uniformly at random from C k (x n ) (cf. (28)). The associated message is then given by:
• log |Q n X | bits to describe Q X .
• log |C n k | bits to describe the index of the reconstruction. The legitimate receiver uses the first part of the message and the key to determine which codebook is being used, and then uses the second part of the message to recover the reconstruction Y n . Finally, all sequences x n such that Q x n / ∈ Q n X (α, δ) are mapped to an arbitrary message m 0 .
Remark 10: One can check that this encoding is feasible by noting that the required number of bits satisfy:
for n large enough. Moreover, it satisfies the excess distortion probability constraint, since
where the last inequality holds for large enough n.
To analyze the performance of the eavesdropper, note that when s/he observes a message m = m 0 , then the induced distribution P X n |M =m is exactly the setup studied in part three of Lemma 9. Indeed, the message m indicates the type of the transmitted sequence and the index of the reconstruction (among 2 nr possible codebooks). For m = m 0 , i.e., for sequences of type outside Q n (α, δ), the performance can still be analyzed in light of Lemma 9 by considering the associated Q XY to be of the form Q X Q Y (i.e., X and Y are independent), in which case min{R e (Q X , D e ), r + R(Q XY , D e )} = min{R e (Q X , D e ), r + R e (Q X , D e )} = R e (Q X , D e ). Now, consider the following chain of inequalities.
where (a) follows from (34) of Lemma 9 and the fact that the codebooks {C k } 2 nr k=1 / ∈Ẽ by construction. Therefore,
where the inequality follows from the following proposition, the proof of which is given in Appendix F. Proposition 10:
Now, note that is arbitrary, and 
As such,
C. Converse Proof
We now prove that
We have already shown, following Theorem 1, that the perfect secrecy exponent E 0 (P, D e ) is achievable by the eavesdropper even in the absence of any observation. It follows immediately that
So we only need to demonstrate a strategy that achieves the first exponent. The strategy is based on the one suggested in Section III-B. We will add an initial stage in which the eavesdropper tries to guess the value of K, by choosing an element uniformly at random from {1, 2, · · · , 2 nr }. The eavesdropper's guess, denoted byK, is equal to K with probability 2 −nr (This will correspond to the r term in (25)). Then, s/he generatesỸ n = h(M,K). Next, the eavesdropper implements the same stages suggested in Section III-B, wherẽ Y n plays the role of Y n . We denote the strategy by g . Remark 11: If h is stochastic, it can be replaced by a deterministic h that still satisfies the reliability constraint. Since this does not change the conditional P X n |M , we can assume, without loss of generality, that h is deterministic. Now, consider any functions f and h implemented by the primary user (and satisfying the distortion constraint). Let P f denote the induced joint probability of (X n , M, K), and P K denote the distribution of K. To analyze the performance of g , note that, unlike Section III, not every realization of Y n necessarily satisfies the distortion constraint. To that end, define
The distortion constraint implies that
Moreover, the analysis of g should take into account the rate constraint R. The following Lemma by Weissman and Ordentlich [30] will be instrumental. Lemma 11 ( [30, Lemma 3]): Let Y n (.) be an n-block code of rate ≤ R. Then, for every Q ∈ Q n X and η > 0, if X n is uniformly distributed over T Q ,
Remark 12: This is not the exact statement found in [30] , but it is a straightforward modification. So, define for every η > 0, x n ∈ X n , and k ∈ K,
Finally, fix > 0, δ > 0 and η > 0, and consider the following chain of inequalities.
where (a) follows from Lemma 5 and (42):
(c) follows from Proposition 14 in Appendix B. Now, note that
Moreover, by Lemma 11,
Combining (50) and (51) yields, for every
where the last inequality holds for large enough n. Continuing from (49), we get
Therefore, taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and noting that , δ, and η are arbitrary, we get
where the last equality follows similarly to equations (39) and (40). Combining (41) and (54) yields our result.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
A. Proof of Property (P1) (P1): For fixed P XY , R(P XY , D e ) is a finite valued, nonincreasing convex function of D e . Furthermore, R(P XY , D e ) is a uniformly continuous function of the pair (P XY , D e ).
Fix P XY . The minimization in (4) is over a compact set, which is non-empty due to assumption (A3). Since I(X; V |Y ) is a continuous function of P V |X,Y , the minimum is achieved. The monotonicity in D e follows directly from the definition. It is easy to check that I(X; V |Y ) is convex in P V |X,Y for fixed P XY . Then, the proof of the convexity of R(P XY , D e ) in D e follows similarly to the case of the rate-distortion function with no side information (see Lemma 2.2.2 in [28] ).
To show the uniform continuity in the pair (P XY , D e ), consider the following proposition, the proof of which is given in Appendix G-A.
Proposition 12: Let N 1 and N 2 be in N, and let S and U be compact subsets of R N1 and R N2 , respectively. Let ν be a non-negative continuous function defined on S × U, and let ϑ be a real-valued continuous function defined on S × U. Suppose they satisfy the following condition: (PA) If (s, u 1 ) ∈ S × U satisfies ν(s, u 1 ) = min u ∈U ν(s, u ), then there exists u 2 such that ϑ(s, u 2 ) = ϑ(s, u 1 ), and for all s ∈ S, ν(s , u 2 ) = min u ∈U ν(s , u ). Let t 0 = max s∈S min u∈U ν(s, u), and let ϕ be a function on S × [t 0 , +∞) defined as follows:
If for fixed s ∈ S, ϕ(s, t) is continuous in t, then ϕ(s, t) is continuous in the pair (s, t).
Remark 13: The proposition generalizes Lemma 2.2.2 in [28] , which shows the continuity of the regular ratedistortion function, and the proof follows along similar lines.
The proposition yields immediately the continuity of R(P XY , D e ) by identifying S with P X Y , U with the set of conditional probability distributions P V |XY , t 0 with D e,min , and the functions ν, ϑ, and ϕ with E[d e (X, V )], I(X; V |Y ), and R(P XY , D e ) respectively. It is easy to check that D e,min = max P XY min P V |XY E[d e (X, V )] so that we can identify it with t 0 . To see why E[d e (X, V )] and I(X; V |Y ) satisfy (PA), note the following. For notational convenience, we write E[d e (X, V )] as d e (P XY , P V |XY ), and I(X; V |Y ) as I(
Then, define P V |XY as follows:
Finally, to prove uniform continuity, note that R(P XY , D e ) = R(P XY , D e,max ) for all D e ≥ D e,max . Therefore, R(P XY , D e ) is uniformly continuous on the set P X Y × [D e,max , ∞). Since it is also uniformly continuous on P X Y × [D e,min , D e,max ], the result is established.
B. Proof of Property (P2)
(P2): For fixed P X , R(P X , D, D e ) is a finite-valued function of (D, D e ). Moreover, for fixed D e , R(P X , D, D e ) is a uniformly continuous function of the pair (P X , D).
Fix P X . The maximization in (5) is over a compact set, which is non-empty due to assumption (A3). Since R(P XY , D e ) is a continuous function of P XY , it is also continuous in P Y |X for fixed P X . Therefore, the maximum is achieved.
As for the continuity in (P X , D) for fixed D e , we view R(P X , D, D e ) as a function of (P X , D), and R(P XY , D e ) as function of (P X , P Y |X ). In the terminology of Proposition 12, we identify S with P X , U with the set of conditional probability distributions P Y |X , t 0 with D min , and the functions ν, ϑ, It remains to show that R(P X , D, D e ) is a continuous function of D for fixed P X and D e . The result of Proposition 12 then applies immediately. To this end, consider the following proposition, the proof of which is given in Appendix G-B Proposition 13: Let N be in N, and let T be a non-empty compact subset of R N . Let L be a real-valued continuous function defined on T . Let T 1 ⊇ T 2 ⊇ · · · be a decreasing sequence of non-empty compact subsets of
Moreover, let S 1 ⊆ S 2 ⊆ · · · be an increasing sequence of non-empty compact subsets of T . Let S = i≥1 S i (where the bar denotes closure of the set). Then
Consequently, if T is also convex, and L c is a real-valued convex and continuous function defined on T with s 0 = min t∈T L c (t), thenL
It follows immediately then that R(P X , D, D e ) is continuous in D for fixed P X and D e , since E[d(X, Y )] is convex and continuous in P Y |X , and R(P XY , D e ) is continuous in P Y |X (for fixed P X ).
C. Proof of Property (P3)
The upper bound is straightforward since R(P XY , D e ), the rate-distortion function with side information, is always upper-bounded by R e (P X , D e ). The lower bound is derived by considering a conditional P Y |X that achieves the ratedistortion function.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
First, consider the following proposition. Proposition 14: For all > 0, there exists n 2 ( , |X |, |Y|, |V|), such that for all n ≥ n 2 , for all D e ≥ D e,min , for each Q XY ∈ Q n XY ,
Proof: It follows directly from the definition that
So, we only need to show the other direction. To that end, let δ > 0 be small enough such that
where · is used to indicate the L 2 -norm. Let n ≥ n 2 ≥ |V| |X ||Y||V|/δ. Fix Q XY ∈ Q n X Y , and let P V |XY be the conditional distribution achieving the minimum in R(Q XY , D e ). We construct a conditional distribution P V |XY as follows. For each (x, y) ∈ X × Y, we will choose P V |X=x,Y =y from Q nQ XY (x,y) V , i.e., the set of rational PMFs over V with denominator nQ XY (x, y) (if Q XY (x, y) = 0, then we can choose P V |X=x,Y =y to be any distribution). This guarantees that Q XY P V |XY is in Q n X YV . Let v(x) = argmin v∈V d e (x, v) for x ∈ X (if more than one v achieves the minimum, choose one arbitrarily). We construct P V |XY by rounding P V |XY as follows. For each (x, y) ∈ X × V, for v = v(x), we set P V |XY (v|x, y) to be the largest integer multiple of 1/(nQ XY (x, y)) that is smaller than P V |XY (v|x, y), i.e., we round down with resolution 1/(nQ XY (x, y)) and denote this operation by . nQ XY (x,y) . Finally, we set P V |XY (v(x)|x, y) appropriately to make P V |XY (.|x, y) a valid probability distribution. It is easy to see that, for such a choice,
.
Moreover, this readily implies that
(58) Let P XY V = Q XY P V |XY , and P XY V = Q XY P V |XY . Now, note that
where the second inequality follows from (57) and (58).
Similarly, we have the following proposition. Proposition 15: For all > 0, there exists n 3 ( , |X |, |Y|, d e ), such that for all n ≥ n 3 , D ≥ D min , D e ≥ D e,min , and for each Q X ∈ Q n X ,
The proof follows along the same lines as that of Proposition 14, and is thus omitted.
By the previous two propositions, for any given > 0, we can set n large enough to satisfy
By taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and noting that is arbitrary, the proof is concluded.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
A. Proof of Property (P4)
Recall, for P X satisfying R(P X , D) ≤ R,
Then S D,R is compact, and non-empty since D ≥ D min and R ≥ R(P X , D). Since R(P XY , D e ) is a continuous function of P XY (by Proposition 1), it is also continuous in P Y |X for fixed P X . Therefore, the maximum is achieved.
To prove continuity of R(P X , R, D, D e ) in (P X , R, D), first consider the following claims.
Claim 1 This follows from a similar argument. We are now ready to prove continuity in the triple
To that end, fix any (P, R, D) ∈ S and consider any sequence
Consider any > 0. By continuity of R(P, R, D, D e ) in R (for fixed P , D, and D e ), we can choose R such that R(P X , D) < R < R and R(P, R , D, D e ) ≥ R(P, R, D, D e ) − /2. We now consider two cases depending on the value of D. Let
If D > D 0 : note that D(P, R) is non-increasing in R, therefore D (P, R) ≤ 0. Moreover, it is convex in R and R(P, D) does not achieve its minimum (D(P,
If D = D 0 : set D = D and P Y |X be a maximizer for R(P, R , D, D e ). Let D(x) = min y∈Y d(x, y) for x ∈ X . Then P Y |X must satisfy the following property: for all (x, y) such that d(x, y) > D(x), P (x) = 0 or P Y |X (y|x) = 0. We can construct P Y |X such that d(x, y) > D(x) ⇒ P Y |X (y|x) = 0, and P (x) > 0 ⇒ P Y |X=x = P Y |X=x . As such, P P Y |X = P P Y |X .
We claim that P Y |X is feasible for the maximization in R(P k , R k , D k , D e ) for sufficiently large k. Indeed,
, where the first equality follows from the construction of P Y |X . So we get
where the first equality follows from the continuity of R(P XY , D e ) in P XY . Noting that is arbitrary, we get our first inequality.
On the other hand, let P (k)
Y |X be a maximizer for
be the corresponding subsequence of maximizers. Since the set of conditional distributions
Y |X } has a convergent subsequence P (kj ) Y |X . Let P Y |X be its limit. We have, I(P ; P Y |X ) = lim →∞ I(P ; P (kj )
B. Proof of Property (P5)
The upper bound follows straightforwardly from the definition and (P3). The lower bound follows from the proof of (P3). Indeed, the bound in (P3) was derived by considering a conditional P Y |X that achieves the rate-distortion function. As such, this choice is feasible since I P XY (X; Y ) = R(P X , D) ≤ R.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Note that the second equality follows simply from the evaluation of R e (Q, D e )−R(Q, D). So we only need to show the first equality.
Note that (P3) asserts that R(Q, D, D e ) ≥ R e (Q, D e ) − R(Q, D), so we only need to show the reverse direction.
Remark 14:
The following proof was suggested by the reviewer, and it significantly simplifies our previous proof. To that end, let
where (a) follows from the fact that Pr(
Note that, N x n ,m ∼ Ber(β), where
where (a) follows from the independence of N x n ,m for different m's, and (b) follows from the fact that (1 − t) N ≤ e −tN . On the other hand,
where (a) follows from the Chernoff bound (cf. [25, Lemma 2] ). Using equations (60) and (61) and the union bound, we get
, establishing (31).
Proof of 2):
To show that (32) holds, consider C n / ∈ E, and (x n , m) where m ∈ C(x n ),
Then,
where (a) follows from (12) . It remains to show (33). To that end, note that, given y n ∈ Y n and m ∈ [N ],
Therefore, 
where the second inequality follows from the union bound and (31). Now, fix {C , and v n ∈ V n , and suppose K = k 0 . Then,
where the inequality follows from (32). Furthermore,
where the last inequality follows from (33). Now, consider {C Pr(X n = x n )Pr(M = m|X n = x n , K = j, C n j )
Pr(X n = x n )Pr(M = m|X n = x n , K = , C n ) (a) ≤ x n :m∈Cj (x n ) 1 2 nr =1
x n :m∈C (x n ) 2 −2n
where (a) follows from the fact that 1 ≤ N x n ≤ 2 2n , and (b) follows from the fact that, for any j, x n :m∈Cj (x n ) 1 = |{x n : (x n , y n m (C j )) ∈ T Q XY }| = |T Q X|Y (y n m (Cj )) | = |T Q X|Y (y n ) | for any y n ∈ T Q Y .
Let {u kj } be the corresponding subsequence of minimizers. Since U is a bounded set, then {u kj } has a convergent subsequence {u kj }. Let u be its limit. By continuity of ν, we have ν(s, u ) = lim →∞ ν(s kj , u kj ) ≤ lim →∞ t kj = t. 
B. Proof of Proposition 13
We restate the proposition. First, note that T is non-empty and compact since a countable intersection of non-empty decreasing compact sets is nonempty and compact. Let 
L(t).
We need to show that L(t k ) → L(t ). Let B δ (t) = {t ∈ T : t − t < δ}, and consider the following claim. We show first how the claim yields our result. Let > 0 be given. By the uniform continuity of L (continuity on a compact set), there exists δ > 0 such that t − t ≤ δ ⇒ |L(t) − L(t )| ≤ . Let k be large enough as guaranteed by the claim. Then, for all t ∈ T k , there exists t ∈ T such that t−t ≤ δ, and subsequently |L(t)−L(t )| ≤ . In particular, there exists t ∈ T such that |L(t k ) − L(t )| ≤ . Then, we get
. It remains to prove the claim to establish the first part of the proposition.
Proof of Claim 1: Fix δ > 0. B δ (T ) is open in T by construction. Therefore, T k \B δ (T ) is closed in T . Since T is closed in R N , then T k \B δ (T ) is also closed in R N . Moreover, it is bounded, so it is compact. Since We need to show that L(s k ) → L(s ). To this end, consider the following claim.
Claim 2: For all δ > 0, there exists k 1 such that for all k ≥ k 1 , S ⊆ B δ (S k ). We show first how the claim yields our result. Let > 0 be given. By the uniform continuity of L, there exists δ > 0 such that t − t ≤ δ ⇒ |L(t) − L(t )| ≤ . Let k be large enough as guaranteed by the claim. Then, for all t ∈ S, there exists t ∈ S k such that t − t ≤ δ, and subsequently |L(t) − L(t )| ≤ . In particular, there exists t ∈ S k such that 
L(t) =L(s),
where the second equality follows from the first part of the proposition. Therefore,L(s) is right-continuous. Now, consider s > s 0 , and let s k be an increasing sequence converging to s. Note that, k≥1 {t ∈ T : L c (t) ≤ s k } = {t ∈ T : L c (t) < s} . 
L(t).
So it suffices to show that S − = S. Clearly, S − ⊆ S since S is closed and S − ⊆ S. It remains to show that any pointt satisfying L c (t) = s is a boundary point of S − . To that end, note that L c (t) is not a local minimum since L c (t) = s > s 0 and L c is convex by assumption. Therefore, any neighborhood oft intersects S − . As such S − = S, andL(s) is leftcontinuous, as desired.
